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Paul Dirac has been undoubtedly one of the cen-tral figures of the last century physics, con-tributing in several and remarkable ways to
the development of quantum mechanics; he was also
at the centre of an active community of physicists,
with whom he had extensive interactions and corre-
spondence. In particular, Dirac was in close con-
tact with Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli. For this rea-
son, among others, Dirac is generally considered a
supporter of the Copenhagen interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics. Similarly, he was considered a physi-
cist sympathetic with the positivistic attitude which
shaped the development of quantum theory in the
1920s. Against this background, the aim of the
present essay is twofold: on the one hand, we will
argue that, analyzing specific examples taken from
Dirac’s published works, he can neither be consid-
ered a positivist nor a physicist methodologically
guided by the observability doctrine. On the other
hand, we will try to disentangle Dirac’s figure from
the mentioned Copenhagen interpretation, since in
his long career he employed remarkably different—
and often contradicting—methodological principles
and philosophical perspectives with respect to those
followed by the supporters of that interpretation.
Quanta 2019; 8: 68–87.
1 Introduction
Paul Dirac has been undoubtedly one of the central fig-
ures of the last century physics, contributing in several
and remarkable ways to the development of quantum me-
chanics. Many important results bear his name as for
instance the bra-ket notation, which became the standard
symbolic representation of the mathematical structure of
quantum theory, or the well-known equation for the mo-
tion of the relativistic electron, which led to the discovery
of the existence of anti-matter.
Moreover, as accurately showed in Wright [1], Dirac
was also at the centre of an active community of physi-
cists, with whom he had extensive interactions and
correspondence—contrary to the usual narration of him
as a lone genius; in particular, it is interesting to point
out for the purposes of the present essay that the British
physicist was in close contact with Bohr, Heisenberg and
Pauli, who in different ways heavily influenced his work
on quantum mechanics. For this reason, among others,
Dirac is generally considered a supporter of the so called
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Copenhagen interpretation, as emphasized for instance
in Bokulich [2, p. 377] and by Kragh in his excellent
monograph on Dirac’s scientific biography [3, p. 265].
Similarly, he was considered a physicist sympathetic with
the positivistic attitude which shaped the development
of quantum theory in the 1920s, being endorsed among
others by notable scientists as Pauli, Heisenberg and the
members of the Go¨ttingen school who gave decisive con-
tributions to the new quantum physics in those years.
Against this background, the aim of the present essay
is two-fold: on the one hand, we will argue that analyz-
ing specific examples taken from Dirac published works,
he can neither be considered a positivist nor a physicist
methodologically guided by the observability doctrine, de-
spite the influence that Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics—
and the empiricist philosophical principles characteriz-
ing it—exercised on Dirac’s approach to quantum theory.
On the other hand, we will try to disentangle Dirac’s
figure from the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
theory, since in his long career he employed remarkably
different—and often contradicting—methodological prin-
ciples and philosophical perspectives with respect to those
followed by Bohr and Heisenberg.
In more detail, we will discuss two case studies show-
ing that Dirac contradicted the observability doctrine in
different ways. For instance, not only he introduced in his
physical theories several theoretical entities which were
not yet experimentally observed at that time (e.g. the
positrons), but also, and more significantly for our pur-
poses, entities which are in principle not observable (e.g.
the infinite sea of negative energy electrons or his quan-
tum mechanical ether). In this context, the expression “in
principle” needs some clarification: we are not referring
to a metaphysical impossibility concerning the ability to
observe a particular theoretical entity, nor do we associate
such expression with discussions about technological ex-
perimental devices employed to measure physical magni-
tudes. We simply mean that, taking into consideration the
mathematical structures of a particular theory, it can be
deduced from them that some theoretical entities cannot
be observed by construction; an alternative, better way
to label this impossibility is formal unobservability, and
it will be used in the remainder of the essay. As we will
see later on, analyzing these examples it will be clear
that in order to construct physical theories, Dirac em-
ployed methodological strategies which have been often
in conflict with the observability principle.
In the second place, we aim also to underline the sev-
eral and important differences between Dirac’s view con-
cerning the role of the projection postulate in quantum
measurements, the correspondence principle and the inter-
theoretic relation between classical and quantum theory
with respect to those of Bohr and Heisenberg (to this re-
gard see Bokulich [2]); consequently, we will argue that
it is not completely correct to consider Dirac a fervent
supporter of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
theory. In summary, we claim that there are sound argu-
ments and solid examples taken from his published papers
showing that, although his rhetoric was often sympathetic
with positivist ideas and/or the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion, his work has been in practice much less influenced
by these doctrines.
The structure of the paper is the following: in Sec-
tion 2 we will introduce the observability principle in the
context of quantum mechanics taking in particular into
account Heisenberg’s empiricist attitude at the basis of
the matrix mechanics formulation of quantum theory, in
Section 3, we show two case studies in which Dirac ex-
plicitly violated the observability doctrine. As mentioned
above, we will consider on the one hand, Dirac’s inter-
pretation of the sea of negative energy electrons, and on
the other, the re-introduction of a quantum mechanical
ether in the context of electrodynamics. Section 4 will be
concerned with the relationship between Dirac and the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Observability Principle
Between 1925 and 1927 Heisenberg published two funda-
mental papers that crucially contributed to the technical
development of quantum mechanics (we are referring here
to Heisenberg [4,5]); these essays, in addition, established
also a conceptual and philosophical jump with respect
to both classical mechanics and the old quantum theory,
since matrix mechanics has been formulated taking ex-
clusively observable quantities into account, eliminating
concepts referring to unobservable theoretical entities. To
this regard, quoting Heisenberg himself, S. Seth writes
that
previous approaches to quantum theory could
be ‘seriously criticized on the grounds that
they contain, as basic element, relationships
between quantities that are apparently unob-
servable in principle, e.g. position and period
of revolution of the electron.’ The alternative,
he declared, was ‘to try to establish a theoreti-
cal quantum mechanics, analogous to classical
mechanics, but in which only relations between
observable quantities occur’ [6, p. 840].
Interestingly, Blum et al. [7, p. 19] note that Heisen-
berg viewed his “new theory as merely establishing rela-
tions between observable quantities”, whereas Hilgevo-
ord and Uffink point clearly out that Heisenberg’s leading
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idea, in his founding papers on quantum theory, was that
only quantities in principle observable and/or measurable
should appear in the vocabulary of a physical theory, “and
that all attempts to form a picture of what goes on inside
the atom should be avoided. In atomic physics the ob-
servational data were obtained from spectroscopy and
associated with atomic transitions. Thus, Heisenberg was
led to consider the “transition quantities” as the basic
ingredients of the theory” [8, Section 2.1].
In general terms, it is possible to claim that in those
years Heisenberg found it methodologically unsatisfac-
tory to formulate a mechanical theory in order to explain
the new observed phenomena making use of notions such
as position and orbit of physical objects, which were not
observable, given that theoretical frameworks based on
such concepts were shown to be empirically inadequate.
Then, he provided a new theory establishing rules for
the observed transition amplitudes and frequencies, tak-
ing the latter as the fundamental objects of his theory,
and consequently, every physical quantity in that frame-
work could have been associated to something observable.
Successively, Born and Jordan interpreted Heisenberg’s
theory as a proper mechanical theory originating what
has become known as matrix mechanics, the first proper
formulation of quantum mechanics [7, Section 7]. In
addition, in order to understand Heisenberg’s empiricist
views, it is worth taking into account the developments
of the conceptual shift contained in Heisenberg [5], the
essay in which the first formulations of the uncertainty
relations were given. In that paper, Heisenberg employed
explicit operational assumptions associating the meaning
of concepts and notions of his theory—for instance the
position or the momentum of a quantum particle—to ex-
perimental procedures capable of measuring them. Hence,
he provided the uncertainty principle with an ontological
interpretation according to which quantum particles can-
not have simultaneously well-defined values for position
and momentum (to this regard the reader may refer to a
note added to Heisenberg [5]; Hilgevoord and Uffink [8]
provide a precise reconstruction of Heisenberg’s interpre-
tation of the uncertainty principle).
Let us call this positivistic attitude the ontological ob-
servability principle. From a philosophical perspective,
the positive content of this principle implies that a mean-
ingful physical theory should be exclusively and uniquely
about what can be experimentally observed and/or manip-
ulated. Alternatively stated, the negative content of such
principle states that objects, quantities or processes which
cannot be directly or indirectly observed should not be
part of the vocabulary of any theoretical building, there-
fore, they should not be considered meaningful terms of
scientific theories. Since the latter guide our Weltanschau-
ung, i.e. our interpretation of the physical reality, and
from them we should reconstruct our manifest image of
the world, it follows that unobservable theoretical entities
should be excluded from any ontological commitment.
Heisenberg, however, was not the only supporter of the
positivist doctrine, as clearly stated by Kragh [3, p. 262]
in the context of quantum physics the observ-
ability doctrine is often referred as to Heisen-
berg’s observability principle, although Heisen-
berg in fact used it after Pauli, who stated it
clearly in 1919: “However, one would like to
insist that only quantities which are in principle
observable should be introduced in physics”.
[...] Quantities that were in principle unobserv-
able would be according to Pauli, “fictitious
and without physical meaning”.
According to Pauli’s perspective, observability is
tightly connected with measurements, in the sense that
what cannot be measured (directly or indirectly) should
not enter into physical theories. This statement clearly
entails the normative ontological import of the observabil-
ity principle mentioned above: if some object, process
or property cannot be in principle or in practice, directly
or indirectly observed, manipulated or measured, then it
should be considered a fictitious entity, meaningless and
consequently not referring to anything.
A locus classicus widely cited to expose Pauli’s ideas
concerning the observability doctrine can be found in his
critique of Weyl’s unified theory (appeared in Weyl [9]).
Pauli was strongly opposed to the idea of an electric
field which was inside or internal to the electron. His
argument goes as follows: the field strength can only
be defined as a force on a certain test-body. Given that
the smallest test-body available is the electron itself, it
follows that one cannot introduce the field strength into
a mathematical point, for it would be a quantity in prin-
ciple non-measurable since every possible measurement
would be inappropriate lacking a test-body. Furthermore,
as Johanna Wolff recently pointed out, non-measurable
quantities threaten the empirical testability of physical
theories: “If a theory stipulates that a certain relationship
holds between several quantities, or that changes in a
particular quantity are responsible for certain phenomena,
then it is desirable to have some measurement procedure,
direct or indirect, of that quantity in order to be able to
generate specific predictions and to test them. If there
are reasons to believe, not only that such measurements
are unavailable, but that they are impossible, then this
counts against the theory in question” [10, p. 21]. Since
the electric field inside an electron cannot be in princi-
ple measured, this very notion has no physical meaning.
Therefore, one should consider it as referring to anything.
Apart from Pauli and Heisenberg, such an observability
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doctrine was also shared by the people in the Go¨ttingen
school, as declared by Heisenberg himself in the fifth
session of his interview with T. Kuhn:
When one spoke about special relativity, people
always said, “Well, there was this very famous
point of Einstein that one should only speak
about those things which one can observe, that
actually the time entering in the Lorentz trans-
formation was the real time.” And in some way
that was an essential turn which Einstein had
given to the Lorentz idea. Lorentz had the right
formulas, but he thought that was the apparent
time. Einstein said, however, “There is no ap-
parent and no real time; there is just one real
time, and that is what you call the apparent
time.” So this turning of the picture by saying
the real things are those which you observe and
everything else is nothing was in the minds of
the Go¨ttingen people. [11]
Against this background, and alongside the ontological
observability principle considered so far, it is worth men-
tioning what can be called the causal observability prin-
ciple, which is contained in [10]. According to Wolff,
it is not correct to claim that the notion of observability
employed by Heisenberg [4] is concerned with measure-
ments, but rather, it should be led back to the notion of
causal inefficacy. More precisely, the notions of elec-
tron’s orbit and electron’s position are not meaningless in
virtue of the absence of hypothetical or actual experimen-
tal procedures able to measure such quantities. Instead,
the latter do not play any causal, mechanical role in the
theory. Therefore, employing a sort of Ockham’s razor,
Heisenberg eliminated such concepts from his own matrix
mechanics. In this manner, Wolff promotes a view of the
observability principle in which ontological commitments
are disentangled from measurability conditions.
In this essay our aim is not to take position for a par-
ticular interpretation of the observability doctrine in the
context of Heisenberg exegesis; it is however interesting
to take into account different versions of the observability
principle, since we are going to show that in his works
Dirac introduced several theoretical entities which are
not only in principle unobservable, but also causally in-
efficient. Thus, Dirac’s theories violate the observability
doctrine in both these variants.
Interestingly, there are several sources in which Dirac
explicitly indicated Heisenberg’s influence on his own
work on relativistic quantum theory and the methodologi-
cal relevancy of the observability principle. In particular,
Dirac thought that Heisenberg’s departure from classical
theory was the recognition of the non-commutative nature
of the algebra of quantum observables: “that one should
confine one’s attention to observable quantities, and set
up an algebraic scheme in which only these observable
quantities appear” [12]. Another source worth mention-
ing is the first session of Dirac’s interview with Kuhn and
Wigner:
Heisenberg made his trip to Cambridge, in I
think, June, or it might have been July, of 1925.
He gave a talk about a new theory to the Kapitza
Club, but I wasn’t a member of the club so I did
not go to the talk. I did not know about it at the
time. The first I heard of it was in September
when Fowler sent to me a copy of the proofs of
Heisenberg’s paper [Dirac is referring to [4]]
and asked me what I thought about it. That was
the first that I heard about it. I think Fowler
found it interesting. He was a bit uncertain
about it and wanted to know what my reaction
to it would be. When I first read it I did not
appreciate it. I thought there wasn’t much in it
and I put it aside for a week or so. Then I went
back to it later, and suddenly it became clear to
me that it was the real thing. And I worked on
it intensively starting from September 1925. I
think it is just a matter of weeks or so before I
got this idea of the Poisson brackets. [13]
Moreover, he added that in discovering a better quantum
theory able to overcome the Bohr–Sommerfeld quantiza-
tion method “Heisenberg’s idea provided the key to the
whole mystery”, with the introduction of matrix mechan-
ics.
In addition, there are many other examples showing
the influence of the observability doctrine on Dirac, since
he considered neutrinos to be unobservable and therefore
without physical existence; similarly he excluded from the
set of existent objects the interior of black holes. In 1927,
Dirac stated that
The main feature of the new theory [i.e. quan-
tum mechanics] is that it deals essentially only
with observable quantities, a very satisfactory
feature. One may introduce auxiliary quan-
tities not directly observable for the purpose
of mathematical calculation; but variables not
observable should not be introduced merely be-
cause they are required for the description of
the phenomena according to ordinary classical
notions [...] The theory enables one to calculate
only observable quantities [...] and any theo-
ries which try to give a more detailed descrip-
tion of the phenomena are useless. (Quoted by
Kragh [3, p. 80])
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In summary, the influence of positivistic ideas and the
observability doctrine endorsed by Heisenberg and Pauli
can be traced in many places in Dirac’s writings. Nonethe-
less, it is legitimate to ask whether or not such influence
really had a decisive impact on Dirac’s methodology of
physics. In what follows we will answer this question in
the negative, explaining that Dirac cannot be considered a
physicist with a positivist attitude, nor that the observabil-
ity principle played a crucial role in his works on quantum
mechanics.
3 Unobservable Theoretical
Entities in Dirac’s Work
In this section, we aim to argue that Dirac should be nei-
ther considered a supporter of a positivist philosophy, nor
a physicist methodologically guided by the observability
doctrine. In order to support our thesis, we are going to
consider two case studies taken from his work in which
he explicitly postulated theoretical entities which are for-
mally not observable in the sense defined in Section 1.
In our view these examples show that, although Dirac
rhetorically embraced the observability principle in many
places, in practice it played a considerably little role in
his methodology.
In what follows, we consider in the first place how
Dirac arrived to interpret the negative energy solutions
of his relativistic equation for the electron as positrons,
whereas in the second subsection, we discuss the re-
introduction of the ether notion in the context of quantum
electrodynamics. It is worth noting, however, that al-
though Dirac was not constrained in formulating new
theories or advancing new ideas by the observability prin-
ciple, he cannot be considered a scientific realist in the
usual sense. To this regard, in fact, many scholars ar-
gued that Dirac’s realism is tightly connected with—and
guided by—aesthetic considerations concerning mathe-
matical beauty and elegance of a given physical theory.
For lack of space we cannot discuss this issue in what
follows. For details the reader may refer to Bueno [14],
Kragh [3], Pashby [15], and Wright [1] among others.
3.1 Case study I: The Dirac Equation
Let us then consider our first case study, the Dirac rel-
ativistic quantum mechanical equation for the electron,
written for the first time by Dirac in his well-known 1928
paper “The quantum theory of the electron” [16]. This
equation is a milestone in the physical literature, being
the first result able to combine and satisfy the axioms
of both quantum mechanics and special relativity theory.
Furthermore, from this equation it has been possible to
predict the existence of anti-matter. Indeed, we will here
cover the main steps that led Dirac to the interpretation of
the negative energy solutions of his equation as positrons,
the anti-particles of the electrons.
In order to provide an elementary introduction to this
equation, we start from non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics, where the total energy of physical systems is defined
as the sum of kinetic and potential energy:
E = T + V =
p2
2m
+ V (1)
then, taking into account usual quantization procedures,
one defines energy and momentum operators:
p −→ −ı~∇, E −→ ı~ ∂
∂t
. (2)
From the definitions of the energy on the one hand, and
the energy and momentum operators on the other, it is
straightforward to write a single-particle Schro¨dinger
equation, which is the fundamental dynamical law of
quantum theory. To obtain such result, it is sufficient
to multiply each side of (1) with the wave function of a
particle ψ(x, t):
Eψ(x, t) = (T + V)ψ(x, t)
With the substitutions (2), we arrive at the usual form:
ı~
∂
∂t
ψ(x, t) =
[
− ~
2
2m
∇2 + V(x, t)
]
ψ(x, t) = Hˆψ(x, t) (3)
where ~ is the Planck constant and Hˆ is the usual
Schro¨dinger Hamiltonian, i.e. the sum of kinetic and
potential energy of the system at hand.
However, the Schro¨dinger equation (3) is not a reli-
able description of particle dynamics if one takes into
consideration relativistic quantum mechanics, since space
and time derivatives are not treated symmetrically as re-
quired by relativity, namely in (3) the derivative of the
time coordinate is first order, whereas the derivative of
spatial coordinates is second order. In order to make the
Schro¨dinger equation relativistic, one may start from the
relativistic energy-momentum relation:
E2 = p2c2 + m2c4.
Following the same procedure used to obtain (3) above,
but making now use of the relativistic energy-momentum
relation, one obtains via simple substitutions:
−~2 ∂
2
∂t2
ψ(x, t) = −~2c2∇2ψ(x, t) + m2c4ψ(x, t). (4)
After rearranging the terms, we arrive to the well-known
Klein–Gordon equation:
1
c2
∂2
∂t2
ψ(x, t) − ∇2ψ(x, t) + m
2c2
~2
ψ(x, t) = 0. (5)
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Contrary to the case of the Schro¨dinger equation, the
Klein–Gordon equation is a second order equation in
both spatial and temporal coordinates. Being Lorentz
covariant, the Klein–Gordon equation satisfies the sym-
metry between space and time coordinates imposed by
relativity. This equation has plane waves solutions of
the form ψ = Ne±ı(p·r−Et), hence, it yields also negative
energy solutions as consequence of the relativistic energy-
momentum relation:
E = ±
√
p2c2 + m2c4.
When this equation appeared in 1926, it was unclear how
to physically interpret the meaning of the negative energy
solutions, as well as the negative probability densities
associated with them, since the wave function would not
anymore be interpretable as a probability amplitude in
the context of the Klein–Gordon equation. In addition,
this equation did (and does) not allow for a treatment
of particles with spin. Thus, due to these difficulties,
the Klein–Gordon equation could not be considered a
successful generalization of (3). Interestingly, this equa-
tion was also discovered by Schro¨dinger who, however,
discarded it for the already mentioned difficulties. The
Klein–Gordon equation is now a well-established result
in quantum field theory, since it describes spin-0 particle
fields, among which we find the Higgs boson.
These were the principal motivations which led Dirac
to propose a new, different equation of motion for the
relativistic electron which could properly be considered
an extension of the Schro¨dinger equation, the well-known
Dirac equation:
ı~
∂
∂t
ψ(x, t) =
βmc2 + c 3∑
n=1
αn pn
ψ(x, t) (6)
which is a first order equation in both the spatial and
the temporal coordinates in order to preserve Lorentz
invariance. Here the wave function represents an elec-
tron of mass m and spacetime coordinates (x, t), c is the
speed of light, and the Dirac Hamiltonian is identified as
HˆDirac =
(
βmc2 + c
∑3
n=1 αn pn
)
(to maintain a coherent
notation throughout, we will not make use of the covari-
ant version of Dirac equation). The Dirac Hamiltonian
contains the terms αn, βwhich are 4×4 matrices, such that
β2 = α2x = α
2
y = α
2
z = I4, βα j + α jβ = α jαk + αkα j = 0,
for every j , k; therefore, α, β are Hermitian, their square
is equal to the identity matrix, and finally, they anti-
commute. The original representations of these Dirac
matrices are [16]:
αn =
(
0 σn
σn 0
)
, β =
(
I2 0
0 −I2
)
where the σn are the Pauli spin matrices, which are three
2 × 2 complex, Hermitian and unitary matrices of the
form:
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −ı
ı 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
These objects have been introduced by Pauli as the ob-
servables corresponding to the particles’ spin along the
axis of the three-dimensional Euclidean space (for a de-
tailed analysis of the Dirac equation the reader may refer
to Thaller [17, Chapter 1]).
Since the αn, β terms appearing within the Dirac Hamil-
tonian are 4 × 4-matrices as stated above, the wave
function which is a solution of this equation must be
a 4−component object which in the physical literature is
called Dirac spinor:
ψ =

ψ1
ψ2
ψ3
ψ4
 .
These solutions of the Dirac equation, these four com-
ponent spinors, naturally include the treatment of the
particles spin, which was not treated by the Klein-Gordon
equation, in virtue of the presence of the Pauli matri-
ces. Moreover, contrary to the case of (5), the question
of the probability density is solved in the case of the
Dirac equation, since it is always positively definite (cf.
Thaller [17]).
Nevertheless, the crucial problem concerning a consis-
tent physical interpretation of the negative energies re-
mained. Wave functions of the form ψ = u(E,p)eı(p·r−Et)
are general solutions of the Dirac equation, where u(E,p)
is a constant four-vector component spinor. In order to
analyze the issue of negative energies, it may be useful to
consider the particular solutions of the Dirac equation (6)
for a free particle at rest (p = 0):
ψ = u(E, 0)e−ıEt
where u(E, 0) is a constant four component spinor. The
Dirac equation has four mutually orthogonal solutions of
the form:
u1(m, 0) = ψ1 =

1
0
0
0
 ; u2(m, 0) = ψ2 =

0
1
0
0
 ;
u3(m, 0) = ψ3 =

0
0
1
0
 ; u4(m, 0) = ψ4 =

0
0
0
1
 .
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Looking at these solutions, it is straightforward to note
that there are two spin states with positive energy (E > 0),
ψ1 and ψ2, and two spin states with negative energies
(E < 0), ψ3 and ψ4. It must be said, furthermore, that
the latter two components cannot be simply discarded
and considered surplus mathematical structure without
any physical meaning, since in quantum mechanics one
needs a complete set of states for the energy, i.e. all
the four solutions in this case. Another problem related
to such negative energy solutions concerned the physical
explanation of the stability of positively charged electrons;
a crucial question to answer was, in fact, why they do not
fall into lower and lower energy states. To solve these
issues Dirac provided several possible interpretations for
these negative energy solutions, arriving in 1931 at the
well-known Dirac sea, or hole theory, which led to the
discovery of the first anti-particle, the positron.
Through a brief analysis of the main steps followed by
Dirac to arrive at this theory, we will see that he employed
methodological criteria in contradiction with the observ-
ability principle in order to provide the Dirac equation
with a consistent solution to the ±e difficulty, as physicists
used to call it.
Firstly, let us point out that the problem of negative
energy solutions of the Dirac equation was strictly related
to both philosophical and physical issues: at the end of
1920s atomic physics included only two kinds of parti-
cles in its ontology, the positive energy electron and the
proton; moreover, since negative energy solutions were
generally considered unphysical, such negative energy
electrons were considered at those times non-existent en-
tities. Nonetheless, as stated above, in the case of the
Dirac equation it was not possible to simply discard them,
consequently, physicists had to find a sound interpreta-
tion for such states. This question was particularly urgent
for Dirac, since he was well aware that perturbations
could cause transitions from states with positive energy
to states of negative energy: “Such a transition would
appear experimentally as the electron suddenly chang-
ing its charge from −e to e, a phenomenon which has
not been observed” [16, p. 612]. Other physicists like
Jordan, Klein, Pauli and Heisenberg found the ±e diffi-
culty a serious trouble for Dirac’s relativistic theory of the
electron; in particular Klein showed that the motion of a
simple electron moving against a barrier is not correctly
described by the Dirac equation, since it provides results
completely different from those of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion. Similarly, another negative consequence entailed by
the expression E = −√p2c2 + m2c4 was that the energy
of the electrons decreased the faster they moved.
To overcome these puzzling issues, in between 1928
and 1929 Dirac proposed a solution of the ±e difficulty
interpreting the vacuum as filled with an infinite density
of negative energy electrons, regarding the vacancies or
“holes” in such sea as protons; it is important to recall that
the Dirac sea hypothesis did not appear in [16], on the con-
trary, in that essay he wrote that negative solution could
have been simply discarded (cf. [16, p. 618]). A similar
idea was advanced by Weyl in the spring of 1929, how-
ever, he identified the negative electrons with protons (for
a detailed historical reconstruction of the proton interpre-
tation of holes, the reader may refer to Kragh [3, Chapter
5]). Dirac knew Weyl’s proposal but was not convinced
by the interpretation of the sea of negative protons for
three main reasons [18, p. 362]:
1. It would entail a violation of the law of electric
charge conservation: if there would be a transition
of an electron from a positive to a negative state,
we would assist to a transition from an electron to a
proton with the consequent charge difference.
2. A negative energy electron would have less energy
the faster it moves, so that it must absorb energy in
order to be at rest, but Dirac stated that “[n]o particle
of this nature have ever been observed”.
3. If a negative energy electron would be a proton, it
would be simultaneously repelled and attracted by
positive energy electrons.
Against this background, Dirac’s own view has been
expressed very clearly in a letter sent to Bohr on 29th
November 1929:
There is a simple way of avoiding the difficulty
of electrons having negative kinetic energy. Let
us suppose the wave equation[W
c
+
e
c
A0 + ρ1(~σ · ~γ + ec A) + ρ0mc
]
ψ = 0
does accurately describe the motion of a single
electron. Let us now suppose there are so many
electrons in the world that all these most stable
states are occupied. The Pauli principle will
then compel some electrons to remain in less
stable states. For example if all the states of
−ve energy are occupied and also few of +ve
energy, those electrons with +ve energy will
be unable to make transitions to states of −ve
energy and will therefore have to behave quite
properly. The distribution of −ve electrons will,
of course, be of infinite density, but it will be
quite uniform so that it will not produce any
electromagnetic field and one would not expect
to be able to observe it. It seems reasonable to
assume that not all the states of negative energy
are occupied, but that there are a few vacancies
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or “holes”. Such a hole which can be described
by a wave function like an X-ray orbit would
appear experimentally as a thing with +ve en-
ergy, since to make the hole disappear (i.e. to
fill it up,) one would have to put −ve energy
into it. Further, one can easily see that such a
hole would move in an electromagnetic field
as though it had a +ve charge. These holes I
believe to be the protons. When an electron of
+ve energy drops into a hole and fills it up, we
have an electron and proton disappearing simul-
taneously and emitting their energy in the form
of radiation. (Quoted in Wright [1, pp. 232–
233]).
Successively, in the essay A Theory of Electrons and
Protons published in 1930, Dirac describes in detail this
idea [18]. Following the argumentative lines of the letter
quoted above, he started from the consideration that the
most stable states for the electrons—the states with lowest
energy—were those with negative energy and high veloc-
ity, then, he continued, all the electrons will tend to fall
into such states emitting radiation. The Pauli exclusion
principle, however, will prevent “more than one electron
going into any one state”. Therefore, Dirac proposed to
consider the overwhelming majority of the infinite den-
sity of negative energy states as occupied. Interestingly,
such infinity is actual in Dirac’s theory, since he explic-
itly stated that “[w]e shall have an infinite number of
electrons in negative-energy states, and indeed an infinite
number per unit volume all over the world, but if their
distribution is exactly uniform we should expect them to
be completely unobservable” [18, p. 362]. According to
the principal idea of this essay, the holes in this infinite
sea of negative energy electrons are protons:
[w]e are therefore led to the assumption that
the holes in the distribution of negative-energy
electrons are the protons. When an electron of
positive energy drops into a hole and fills it up,
we have an electron and proton disappearing
together with emission of radiation [18, p. 363].
Concerning this particular solution to the ±e difficulty,
Kragh stressed that the methodological principle guiding
Dirac was a belief about the unity of nature, i.e, the idea
for which matter was composed by two essential ingredi-
ents, electrons and protons—neutrinos have been recently
proposed at the time but physicists were skeptical about
their actual existence, and the neutron was then referred
to the electron-proton pair, and not regarded as a new
kind of particle. Hence, following the available knowl-
edge in atomic physics and its practice, he preferred not
to introduce new theoretical entities—to this specific re-
gard Kragh speaks also about sociological concerns given
the very conservative attitude toward the proliferation of
new particles in the physicists community. Be that as
it may, Dirac had no problem in introducing a formally
unobservable sea of negative electrons in his theory in
order to solve the ±e difficulty, a move that would not be
justified according to the observability doctrine. Another
instantiation of the unity of nature principle is traceable
in those years, since Dirac conceived the possibility to re-
duce the then known species of elementary particles just
to the electron. More precisely, he thought that electrons
and protons were not independent objects but different
manifestations of the very same fundamental particle:
It has always been the dream of philosophers to
have all matter built up from one fundamental
kind of particle, so that it is not altogether satis-
factory to have two in our theory, the electron
and the proton. There are, however, reasons for
believing that the electron and proton are really
not independent, but are just two manifestations
of one elementary kind of particle [19, p. 605].
Despite Dirac’s efforts in trying to provide a physi-
cally sound and metaphysically elegant solution to the
±e difficulty, his interpretation of holes as protons did
not convinced many physicists. In particular, Heisenberg
calculated the electron-proton interaction according to
Dirac’s theory arriving to the conclusion that these two
particles would have the very same mass, a result which
is contradicted by already available evidence, protons
having a much heavier mass with respect to electrons.
Successively, confronted with Heisenberg’s objection,
and with many other physical, mathematical and philo-
sophical critiques to the proton hypothesis Dirac aban-
doned it, turning to the positive electron idea (it should be
also stated that Dirac himself was aware of the inherent
difficulties of this proposal, but the force of the unitary
idea of matter pushed him to try to save such hypothesis,
as noted in Kragh [3, pp. 96–99]). He introduced for the
first time in [20] a hypothetical particle with the same
mass of the electron but with opposite charge (ironically,
Dirac thought that also the proton could have its unfilled
hole so that “[i]n a few lines he doubled the number of
elementary particles” [3, p. 104]):
A hole, if there were one, would be a new kind
of particle, unknown to experimental physics,
having the same mass and opposite charge to
an electron. We may call such a particle an
anti-electron [20, p. 61].
In his 1931 paper, Dirac proposed the well-known rev-
olutionary hypothesis about the nature of the vacuum,
suggesting to consider it as composed by an infinity of
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negative energy electron eigenstates, specifying this time
that all—“and not nearly all” [20, p. 61]—such states are
occupied. The holes, then, were interpreted as positrons,
and this idea became the standard interpretation of such
negative energy solutions of the Dirac equation. To this
regard, Bohm and Hiley summed up the hole theory in a
concise and precise manner, characterizing it as follows:
What he [Dirac] proposed was that in the vac-
uum, all the negative energy states were filled.
Because the particles satisfy the exclusion prin-
ciple, the transition of particles to the negative
energy states could therefore never occur. How-
ever, when a particle went to a positive state, it
would leave a hole that acted like an antiparti-
cle. So in effect a positive and a negative pair
would be created in such process [21, p. 276].
(Interestingly Bohm himself in [22] and in collaboration
with Hiley [21, Chapter 12] reformulated the Dirac sea in
the context of Bohmian mechanics. For contemporary de-
velopments of the hole theory in the Bohmian framework,
the reader may refer especially to Colin [23,24] and Colin
and Struyve [25], Deckert [26], Deckert et al. [27, 28].
A philosophical discussion of the Dirac sea in Bohmian
mechanics is contained in Deckert et al. [29]).
Having roughly presented the crucial steps that led
Dirac to postulate the positron hypothesis, let us now
consider some philosophical and methodological aspects
of the above discussion.
Firstly, it is straightforward to understand that Dirac
violated the observability principle in two different ways
with the hole theory: (1) positrons were not yet observed
quantities—they would have been discovered by Carl An-
derson at Caltech later in 1932—contrary to the case, for
instance, of transition amplitudes in Heisenberg’s matrix
mechanics, and more importantly (2) the sea of negative
energy electrons is formally unobservable. According to
the Dirac sea picture, as already pointed out, the holes
are the only observable entities, whereas the sea must be
unobservable since all the negative energy states are occu-
pied in virtue of the Pauli exclusion principle; therefore, it
follows that being electrons in negative states in a perfect
homogeneous distribution, it is impossible to interact or
observe such sea. Moreover, we do not have empirical
evidence for such infinite density of negative energy elec-
trons in the actual world, so that the sea is also causally
inert (this feature is also a logical consequence of the
Pauli exclusion principle, since negative energy electrons
are homogeneously distributed and do not take part in
interactions). Hence, in order to provide the ±e difficulty
a sound physical solution, Dirac did not hesitate to make
abstract and audacious speculations involving unobserv-
able entities, showing in practice how the observability
doctrine has not been an interesting methodological op-
tion in formulating the hole theory. To this regard, in fact,
it must be noted that many physicists raised strong objec-
tions also to Dirac’s theory as proposed in 1931: some
viewed the infinite sea of positrons as an entity close to
the classic ether, regarding it as a purely metaphysical
notion, as communicated to Dirac by Igor Tamm in a
letter dated 5th June 1933. As reported also by Kragh, no-
table figures like Landau and Peierls evaluated negatively
Dirac’s theory affirming that it was “senseless” in virtue
of the presence of this unobservable sea. Similarly, Bohr
was unhappy with the hole theory and he expressed all his
perplexities in many letters to Dirac, most of them related
with the infinite negative—but not observable—electric
charged introduced with the positron sea. Strong oppo-
sition came also from Pauli who refused to associate the
new particle experimentally discovered by Anderson with
Dirac’s hole particle (cf. [3, pp. 111–112] and footnotes
104–105).
Secondly, we have seen that Dirac employed method-
ological principles which can potentially contradict the
observability doctrine. Discussing the proton interpreta-
tion of the holes, in fact, we underlined that he was led by
an ontological belief concerning the unity of nature, Dirac
being not only reticent to introduce additional particles
to those already known, but also determined to show the
metaphysical inter-dependence of electrons and protons.
This principle can be understood as a sort of reductionist
claim according to which nature is composed by very
few essential elements. Interestingly, as we already noted,
Dirac was not interested by the objections pointing out the
empirical inadequacy of the “hole=protons” hypothesis,
and this attitude is certainly in conflict with a positivistic
methodology. Indeed, Dirac suddenly abandoned the uni-
tary view when rigorous mathematical arguments showed
that his theory entailed wrong consequences concerning
the mass ratio between the electron and the proton. As
said above, critiques pointing out empirical difficulties of
the hole theory were of secondary importance for Dirac,
and, again, this would be not acceptable by a physicist
guided by the observability doctrine.
Thirdly, another methodological principle adopted by
Dirac is the principle of plenitude, as Kragh called it. Ac-
cording to its traditional formulation, everything that can
be conceived as a metaphysical possibility, can be also
an actuality in our world. In the context of theoretical
physics—which is where Dirac was moving—such prin-
ciple, with the due modifications, is often employed “in
the sense that entities are assumed to exist in nature as far
as they are subject of mathematically consistent descrip-
tion and are not ruled out by the so-called principles of
“impotence”, or general statements that assert the impos-
sibility of achieving something” Kragh [3, p. 271]. Thus,
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according to this principle, if an entity x is amenable of
consistent mathematical treatment, its existence in nature
cannot be in principle ruled out. Furthermore, to this re-
gard it is important to stress that Dirac explicitly followed
what Eddington [30, pp. 222–223] called the Principle of
Identification; having defined a pure geometrical system
he affirms that it
is intended to be descriptive of the relation-
structure of the world. The relation-structure
presents itself in our experience as a physical
world consisting of space, time and things. The
transition from the geometrical description to
the physical description can only be made by
identifying the tensors which measure physical
quantities with tensors occurring in the pure
geometry; and we must proceed by inquiring
first what experimental properties the physical
tensor possesses, and then seeking a geomet-
rical tensor which possesses these properties
by virtue of mathematical identities. If we can
do this completely, we shall have constructed
out of the primitive relation-structure a world
of entities which behave in the same way and
obey the same laws as the quantities recognised
in physical experiments.
Dirac, in fact, when explaining the new directions and
advancements of theoretical physics claimed that:
The most powerful method of advance that can
be suggested at present is to employ all the
resources of pure mathematics in attempts to
perfect and generalise the mathematical formal-
ism that forms the existing basis of theoretical
physics, and after each success in this direc-
tion, to try to interpret the new mathematical
features in terms of physical entities (by a pro-
cess like Eddington’s Principle of Identifica-
tion) [20, p. 60].
Dirac made use of the plenitude principle advancing the
anti-electron hypothesis: although anti-electrons were not
yet observed, they were nonetheless a consistent solution
of the Dirac equation, therefore, a realist interpretation
of such particles was possible. Alternatively stated, in
virtue of the plenitude principle, since the anti-electron
hypothesis is mathematically consistent, such entities can
represent physically real particles. Interestingly, Dirac
used several times the plenitude principle in his works,
for instance Kragh mentions Dirac’s hypothesis concern-
ing the existence of monopoles, which are not formally
excluded by quantum theory. To this regard, Dirac clearly
wrote that “one of the elementary rules of nature is that,
in the absence of law prohibiting an event or phenomenon
it is bound to occur with some degree or probability. To
put it simply and crudely: Anything that can happen does
happen. Hence physicists must assume that the magnetic
monopole exists unless they can find a law barring its
existence” (quoted in [3, p. 272]). We will see with the
second case study, the plenitude principle is again at work
for Dirac tried to reintroduce a quantum mechanical ether.
To conclude this section, we point out that in order to
understand Dirac’s methodology, it is crucial to under-
line that the principle of plenitude reflects a general rule
often followed by the British physicist, i.e. to deduce
physics from mathematical considerations—as shown by
the above quotations—meaning that physical conclusions
are drawn starting from the mathematical structure of a
given theory. It is straightforward to note the tension
and the contradiction between such methodology and the
observability doctrine. Furthermore, given the prominent
importance given by Dirac to mathematics, it is not a
surprise that the observability principle succumbed sev-
eral times to other more important methodological lines.
This fact is sufficient to show, in our opinion, that Dirac
cannot be considered in any meaningful way of the term
an empiricist or a positivist, despite his rhetorical defence
of such philosophies.
3.2 Case study II: The Ether and Quantum
Mechanics
The second case study concerns Dirac’s theory of elec-
trodynamics; what is philosophically interesting for our
discussion is that in this context Dirac explicitly reintro-
duced a quantum mechanical ether, a notion which has
been abandoned at the beginning of the 20th century fol-
lowing Einstein’s theory of special relativity. As we will
see, Dirac’s ether is a formally unobservable theoretical
entity. Thus, it provides a further example showing how
Dirac’s methodology was not guided by the observability
doctrine to which he has often been associated.
The British physicist was not satisfied with the way
in which quantum electrodynamics developed during the
1930s, since that theory had to face the well-known prob-
lems entailed by divergences and infinities. Dirac, as
usual, tried to solve them by taking an unusual way; in
order to tackle these issues, in fact, he thought it would
have been necessary to start from a well-defined clas-
sical theory of electrodynamics, i.e. a classical theory
in which the central problem of the self-interaction of
electron disappears:
We are now faced with the difficulty that, if
we accept Maxwell’s theory, the field in the
immediate neighbourhood of the electron has
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an infinite mass. This difficulty has recently re-
ceived much prominence in quantum mechan-
ics (which uses a point model of the electron),
where it appears as a divergence in the solution
of the equations that describe the interaction of
an electron with an electromagnetic field and
prevents one from applying quantum mechan-
ics to high-energy radiative processes. One may
think that this difficulty will be solved only by a
better understanding of the structure of the elec-
tron according to quantum laws. However, it
seems more reasonable to suppose that the elec-
tron is too simple a thing for the question of the
laws governing its structure to arise, and thus
quantum mechanics should not be needed for
the solution of the difficulty. Some new physi-
cal idea is now required, an idea which should
be intelligible both in the classical theory and
in the quantum theory, and our easiest path of
approach to it is to keep within the confines
of the classical theory [31, pp. 148–149, our
italics].
Such a theory was initially formulated in [31] and then
he continued to develop it in a number of publications
appeared in the 1950s.
Hence, the British physicist proposed to start from a
new classical theory based on more sound foundations
in order to be able to improve the quantized version;
this example shows the interplay between classical and
quantum theories typical of Dirac’s methodology, an at-
titude that many scholars labeled the reverse correspon-
dence principle. This route was taken before Dirac also
by Adriaan Fokker, a collaborator of Lorentz, who was
pushed by the pertinent problems of quantum electrody-
namics to improve the classical theory (for details see
Kragh [3, p. 191]), we will give more details about these
issues in the next section.
According to the classical theory of the electron as
developed by Lorentz, Poincare´, and many other physi-
cists, the electron was thought to be a spherical particle
of finite size, or more precisely, a spherical distribution of
electricity. In this context, if an electron is moving in an
external magnetic field, it is subject to the Lorentz force.
However, it also is subject to a self-force created by the
field produced by the electron itself. This fact clearly was
a source of problems, since physicists thought that the
electron would be unstable in virtue of this self-force. In
more detail, Lorentz showed that the electron’s self-force
can be written as follows:
~Fself = −α e
2
ac2
~˙v +
2
3
e2
c3
~¨v − βe
2a
c4
...
~v + . . . (7)
where in this equation α, β are coefficients depending on
the electron’s structure, and the dots on~v represent the dif-
ferentiation with respect to time. The self-force problem
can be stated taking into account a point electron, i.e. an
electron in which the electron’s radius is zero (a = 0). In
this case the third and the higher terms vanish, but the first
becomes infinite, on the other hand “if 1/a is kept finite,
the equation of motion contains not only an acceleration
term but also derivatives of the acceleration to all higher
orders” [3, p. 190]. Against this background, Dirac’s aim
was to find the correct mathematical equations to model
the electron’s behavior with respect to the set of available
evidence obtained from experiments.
Dirac solved the self-interaction problem starting from
the usual Maxwell’s equations, defining then the field
quantities in terms of potentials. What is interesting for
us is that he took into consideration not only retarded
fields but also advanced fields, which generally were
considered unphysical solutions. Dirac’s idea was to
propose a symmetrical role between them, so that using
both retarded and advanced field he was able to avoid the
divergent term v in his equations (cf. for technical details
Kragh [3, Chapter 9]). Dirac, furthermore, developed
Lorentz’s classical theory arriving at an equation where
neither infinity terms, nor structural dependencies were
involved. Such theory is today known as Lorentz–Dirac
theory.
The difficult part of the work was, needless to say,
its extension to quantum electrodynamics. As already
stressed, Dirac aimed to remove the infinities of quantum
electrodynamics starting from a classical theory in which
such infinities do not occur. However, although he actu-
ally arrived at a classical theory without infinities, he was
not able to extend this feature to the quantized theory;
this fact is clearly expressed in a letter to Bohr dated 5th
December 1938:
I spent the whole term working on the quanti-
zation of my classical electron theory. The first
problem is to express the classical equations
in Hamiltonian form. [...] With the classical
theory in Hamiltonian form it is merely a me-
chanical matter to go over to the quantum the-
ory. I have not yet satisfied myself, however,
that the resulting quantum theory has no infini-
ties. From the closeness of the analogy between
classical and quantum theory one would expect
that any classical theory from which the infini-
ties have been eliminated would go over into
a quantum theory without infinities (quoted in
Kragh [3, pp. 195–196]).
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Unfortunately, Dirac did not succeed in obtaining a
quantum electrodynamics free of infinite terms. In the
1950s, he continued with his work on classical electro-
dynamics still motivated by the same belief according to
which, since there is a structural similarity and continuity
between classical and quantum mechanics, it would make
sense to solve the problems of quantum theory putting
the classical theory on firm mathematical grounds (the
formal analogy between classical and quantum mechan-
ics has been analyzed by Dirac in detail in his textbook
The Principles of Quantum Mechanics [32], and this is-
sue was recurrent in Dirac’s career; to this regard the
reader may refer also to his [33] and [34]). In his work
during the 1950s, Dirac considered not individual elec-
trons as the elementary blocks of his theoretical building,
but rather a continuous stream of electricity: electrons as
point particles would have then be considered effects of
quantum electrodynamics. It is in this context that Dirac
re-introduced into physics the notion of an universal ether,
which, he thought, could have been made compatible with
the special theory of relativity.
Dirac reconstructed the argument against the ether that
led to the elimination of this notion as follows: Firstly,
let us consider a perfect vacuum, i.e. a region of space-
time where there is no matter and no fields; according to
the principle of relativity, in this region all the possible
directions within the light-cone must be all equivalent.
However, if an ether would exist at each space-time point
of the region under consideration, it would have moved
with a definite velocity (obviously less than c, otherwise
it would have violated another axiom of special relativity).
The latter would have consequently preferred one of the
possible directions among those possible in the light-cone.
Therefore, one obtains a contradiction with the relativity
principle, since the ether would break the equivalence
among the directions in the vacuum. Secondly, the ether’s
velocity could not be measured, so that, according to the
positivistic attitude surrounding the special theory of rel-
ativity, something that could not possibly be observed
should not be admitted as existing; thus, the notion of the
ether was soon dismissed after the appearance of special
relativity.
In order to show how such arguments did not definitely
rule out the notion of an ether, Dirac suggested to take
also the knowledge derived from quantum mechanics into
account, and apply it to the ether:
The velocity of the ether, like other physical
variables, is subject to uncertainty relations.
For a particular physical state the velocity of
the ether at a certain point of space-time will
not usually be a well-defined quantity, but will
be distributed over various possible values ac-
cording to a probability law obtained by taking
the square of the modulus of a wave function.
We may set up a wave function which makes
all values for the velocity of the ether equally
probable. Such a wave function may well rep-
resent the perfect vacuum state in accordance
with the principle of relativity. [35, p. 605].
Hence, if one characterizes the ether as a physical quan-
tity with a state of motion, there are arguments from quan-
tum mechanics that enable one to reintroduce it among
the realm of the acceptable theoretical entities. As noted
by Kragh [3, pp. 201–202], if the ether is subject to the
laws of quantum theory, its “velocity would be distributed
over various possible values according to some probabil-
ity law. The principle of relativity indeed forbade that
there be any preferred direction of spacetime, which is a
perfect vacuum, but this requirement could be reconciled
with the ether hypothesis if one assumed that in a vacuum
all velocities of the ether would be equally probable and
distributed in a Lorentz-invariant way”.
The ether, then, was identified with the velocity field of
the streams of electricity, giving it a realistic interpretation
and a dignity as a proper physical entity. Such a quantum
mechanical ether, however, was a weird kind of field
being substantially a set of potentialities defined at certain
space-time points; according to Dirac’s theory, while the
ontology of the theory was about the stream of electricity,
the ether filled the vacuum.
In a successive paper [36], Dirac restated his arguments
characterizing the ether as a “light and tenuous” form of
matter. Since the quantum indeterminacy applies to very
small and light objects, Dirac argued, then it follows that
the ether “must be strongly affected by the principle of
indeterminacy” [36, p. 145]. Therefore, at each space-
time point the ether must have indeterminate values for its
positions and momenta—one among those permissible—
in order to not generate contradictions with relativity.
It is clear from this brief presentation of Dirac’s ideas
concerning quantum electrodynamics that Eddington’s
principle of identification was implemented also in this
case: this new “quantum” ether has been considered a
serious physical possibility by Dirac since he was able
to provide an argument (i) against its elimination, and
(ii) its coherence with special relativity in the context of
his new theory of electrodynamics. As in the case of the
Dirac sea, the ether has been introduced as a possible the-
oretical entity referring to something physically existing.
Furthermore, such a notion is inherently characterized
as formally non-observable, since it is subject to Heisen-
berg’s position-momentum uncertainty relation, which is
taken by Dirac to forbid the simultaneous measurement—
and definition—of position and velocity of quantum ob-
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jects, and consequently of the quantum mechanical ether.
Therefore, we can conclude that also in this case the ob-
servability doctrine has not been taken into consideration
by Dirac in his reflections concerning the problems of
infinities in quantum electrodynamics.
Let us conclude this section stressing that Dirac him-
self unambiguously stated that unobservable theoretical
entities cannot be dispensed with in the structure and vo-
cabulary of physical theories, contrary to the fundamental
tenets of the observability doctrine:
there must be unobservable quantities coming
into the theory and the hard thing is to find what
these unobservable quantities are [37, p. 759].
Finally, it is fair to claim that the observability
principle—in both the characterizations we have given
above, the ontological and the causal—“did not affect
his scientific work. In fact, he [Dirac] did not hesitate to
propose quantities that seemed to have only the slightest
connection to observables” [3, p. 264].
4 Dirac and the Copenhagen
Interpretations of Quantum
Theory
After having shown that the observability doctrine was en-
dorsed rhetorically by Dirac in several places, but poorly
considered in his own work, in this section we argue
that he should be disentangled from the supporters of
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. More
specifically, in what follows we will show that often
Dirac’s views on quantum theory diverged remarkably—
and in an irreconcilable way—from those of Bohr and
Heisenberg.
Let us underline in the first place that many scholars
argued that it is disputable whether such interpretation ex-
ists, given that Bohr and Heisenberg had different—often
conflicting—views concerning the physical and philo-
sophical content of quantum theory (to this regard see
Howard [38] and Jaeger [39, Chapter 3]. Pauli is also
often associated with the Copenhagen interpretation, but
even his views differed substantially from those of Bohr.
To support this claim it is sufficient to consider the pos-
itivistic attitude he had in the 1920s, or the subjective
interpretation of the quantum mechanical wave function;
these that were not shared by the Danish physicist). In par-
ticular, among other things, they disagreed about whether
or not the wave function collapses in measurement situ-
ations: according to Bohr there was no collapse of the
ψ function—being entanglement and complementarity
the real novelties brought about by quantum mechanics
with respect to classical physics—whereas for Heisen-
berg, the observer-induced quantum jumps are the pri-
mary innovation of quantum theory. Notably, to this re-
gard Howard [38] claimed that the so-called “Copenhagen
interpretation” was Heisenberg’s postwar invention:
What was new in 1955 was Heisenberg’s dub-
bing his amalgam of ideas the “Copenhagen
interpretation”, but having so dubbed it, Heisen-
berg regularly reinforced the invention of a uni-
tary Copenhagen point of view and posed as
its chief spokesperson[...]. It helps to recall
Heisenberg’s situation in 1955, especially the
fact that the person who was Bohr’s favorite
in the 1920s had become a moral exile from
the Copenhagen inner circle in the postwar pe-
riod, mainly because of the bitter rupture in
Heisenberg’s relationship with Bohr during his
ill-fated visit to Copenhagen in September 1941
after taking over the leadership of the German
atomic bomb project [...]. What better way for
a proud and once ambitious Heisenberg to re-
claim membership in the Copenhagen family
than by making himself the voice of the Copen-
hagen interpretation? [38, p. 677].
Interestingly for our purposes, if one considers the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics the ex-
pression of Bohr’s views, it is straightforward to notice
that under many respects Dirac’s formulation of quantum
mechanics diverges remarkably from it. In this section,
in fact, we will concentrate on the diverse conceptions (1)
of quantum measurements, and (2) of the correspondence
principle that Bohr and Dirac had. Similarly, if one con-
siders the Copenhagen interpretation as the expression of
Heisenberg’s perspectives on foundational issues about
quantum theory, it is equally straightforward to show the
remarkable differences with respect to Dirac’s ideas. Not
only the British physicist did not embrace in practice the
young Heisenberg’s observability doctrine as shown in
the previous section, but also Dirac never shared the sub-
jectivist interpretation of the quantum mechanical wave
function endorsed by the later Heisenberg (cf. [40, pp. 99–
100]). Furthermore, as we will see in the remainder of
this section, they held opposite views about the inter-
theoretic relations between classical and quantum me-
chanics (cf. Bokulich [2] on this point), a disagreement
which is reflected in their incompatible methodologies.
Thus, given the peculiarity and originality of Dirac’s
ideas about the interpretation of quantum theory, we shall
conclude that it is not quite correct to include him among
the proponents of the Copenhagen view—in both formu-
lations given above—despite the influence that Bohr and
Heisenberg had on his work on quantum theory.
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4.1 Collapse or Not Collapse?
According to the usual presentations of quantum mechan-
ics, when a wave function undergoes a quantum measure-
ment, it collapses into one of the admissible eigenstates
of the measured operator. It is exactly the interaction
between observed system and experimental device that
causes the suppression of the Schro¨dinger equation and
the consequent projection of the ψ function. However,
such treatment of quantum measurements was not en-
dorsed by one of the founding fathers of quantum theory.
Niels Bohr, in fact, never introduced explicitly the pro-
jection postulate in his works on quantum mechanics,
as Howard [38, p. 672] explicitly stated: “Bohr never
endorsed a disturbance analysis of measurement [...]”,
he “always criticized Heisenberg for promoting the dis-
turbance analysis, arguing that while indeterminacy im-
plies limitations on measurability, it is grounded in limi-
tations on definability”. Contrary to Heisenberg’s ideas,
according to the Danish physicist, the novelties intro-
duced by quantum measurements—and more generally
by quantum mechanics—are non-separability, entangle-
ment and complementarity, as stated a few lines above
(for details concerning Bohr’s philosophy of quantum
mechanics the reader may refer to Howard [38, 41] and
Jaeger [39, pp. 124–136]). To this specific regard, Bohr
himself wrote that
the quantum postulate implies that any obser-
vation of atomic phenomena will involve an
interaction with an agency of observation not
to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent
reality in the ordinary physical sense can nei-
ther be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the
agencies of observation. After all, the concept
of observation is in so far arbitrary as it depends
on which objects are included in the system to
be observed [42, pp. 54–55].
In this passage it is notably claimed that in the context
of quantum theory—contrary to the classical case—it
is not possible to assign an independent reality to the
observed system and the measuring device, once they
have interacted; using a technical jargon, they form what
is now called an entangled pair. Therefore, the states of
the observed system and that of the measuring device
show a mutual dependence, and they cannot be written
as if they were separable, i.e. independent states as they
were before the measurement.
To this specific regard, Bohr always emphasized that
quantum phenomena—generally defined by him as the
observation of a certain quantity obtained under partic-
ular circumstances, i.e. with specific experimental ar-
rangements, which play a crucial role in Bohr’s theory
of measurements—involve a mutual interconnection be-
tween the system that has been observed and the whole
experimental situation used to measure it. Consequently,
properties of quantum objects strictly depend on the in-
teractions with the devices employed in measurement
situations; thus, changing the experimental setup will
necessarily affect the nature of quantum systems:
The unambiguous account of proper quantum
phenomena must, in principle, include a de-
scription of all relevant features of the experi-
mental arrangement [. . . ]. In the case of quan-
tum phenomena, the unlimited divisibility of
events implied in such an account is, in prin-
ciple, excluded by the requirement to specify
the experimental conditions. Indeed, the fea-
ture of wholeness typical of proper quantum
phenomena finds its logical expression in the
circumstance that any attempt at a well-defined
subdivision would demand a change in the ex-
perimental arrangement incompatible with the
definition of the phenomena under investiga-
tion. [43, p. 3]
Another central tenet of Bohr that comes out in this
citation is the complementarity principle. Although in
quantum mechanics knowledge of physical systems is
obtainable uniquely through measurements, there are
nonetheless pieces of information about their properties
that cannot be obtained simultaneously given the incom-
patibility of experimental protocols needed to observe
them, so that they cannot be represented by a unique
quantum state of the examined system. For instance, ac-
cording to quantum mechanics, it is not possible to obtain
well-defined values for the position and the momentum of
quantum particles in a single observation—although one
can easily measure these observables individually—given
the incompatibility of experimental procedures needed
to observe them; other classical examples of complemen-
tary properties of quantum systems are the wave-particle
duality, or the spin of particles along different axis. Thus,
the information obtainable by incompatible experiments
is complementary.
To this regard, Stapp [44, p. 113], claims that “any
preparation protocol that is maximally complete, in the
sense that all the procedures are mutually compatible and
are such that no further procedure can add any more in-
formation, can be represented by a quantum state, and
that state represents in a mathematical form all the con-
ceivable knowledge about the object that experiments
can reveal to us”. Thus, since for Bohr quantum states
represent the complete description of physical systems
(cf. Jaeger [39, p. 125]), it is clear (1) that the nature of
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quantum objects essentially depends on experimental pro-
tocols and measuring devices, and (2) that observations do
not reveal any pre-existing values of properties attributed
to quantum systems. Thus, in virtue of the practical im-
possibility to experimentally show the complementary
features of quantum objects, and the definition that Bohr
gave to quantum phenomena, it follows that we cannot
speak about the properties of quantum objects in isola-
tion, so that one concludes that they have indeterminate
features in non-measurement situations.
Furthermore, Bohr thought that the quantum formal-
ism cannot be applied to experimental devices, being
strongly convinced that one should describe them classi-
cally. More precisely, it is worth noting that Bohr strongly
emphasized not only that the results of quantum measure-
ments are necessarily expressed in terms of arrangements
of macroscopic objects—the only physical bodies that
we can directly experience—but also that the experimen-
tal procedure must be controllable and communicable
in order to provide an objective description of quantum
phenomena:
it is decisive to recognize that, however far
the phenomena transcend the scope of classi-
cal physical explanation, the account of all evi-
dence must be expressed in classical terms [45,
p. 39].
Hence, making communicability a necessary requirement
for objectivity, classical, everyday concepts cannot be
avoided in order to have some knowledge of quantum
systems, since we have to ascribe “definite properties
to individual objects, a mode of description inherent in
ordinary language and definitive of “classical” physics”
[38, p. 674].
Taking into account, instead, Dirac’s formulation of
quantum theory, it is straightforward to see that it pro-
vides a remarkably different account of experimental sit-
uations. In the first place, the primary difference is that
he gives a completely formal treatment of measurements,
contrary to the more qualitative descriptions of Bohr. It is
well-known, in fact, that Dirac defined a quantum system
as described by a state vector |ψ〉, which is an element
of a complex vector space called Hilbert space H , pro-
viding a complete specification of its properties which
are represented by positive, linear Hermitian operators
A, acting on H . According to Dirac’s formulation of
quantum mechanics, given a measurable quantity A, its
possible values are the eigenvalues (real numbers) of the
associated operatorA, whereas possible states in which
a system may be found after a measurement of A are
represented by the eigenvectors ofA. Implicitly this de-
fines the eigenvalue–eigenstate link, a core tenet of his
approach to quantum mechanics:
The expression that an observable ‘has a partic-
ular value’ for a particular state is permissible
in quantum mechanics in the special case when
a measurement of the observable is certain to
lead to the particular value, so that the state is
in an eigenstate of the observable [. . . ]. In the
general case we cannot speak of an observable
having a value for a particular state, but we
can speak of its having an average value for
the state. We can go further and speak of the
probability of its having any specified value for
the state, meaning the probability of this spec-
ified value being obtained when one makes a
measurement of the observable. [32, p. 253]
In this quotation, the probabilistic and statistical character
of quantum theory is clearly evident. This probability,
however, refers to an inherent feature of the world, since
only in measurement situations a specific value of the
measured observable is obtained. Furthermore, accord-
ing to the British physicist, the interactions occurring in
measurement situations cause a stochastic “jump” of the
wave function, a projection of |ψ〉 onto a possible eigen-
state of the observed operator. This is exactly what makes
quantum mechanics inherently probabilistic for Dirac.
He viewed these jumps as “unavoidable disturbance” of
quantum systems in measurement situations:
When we measure a real dynamical variable ξ,
belonging to the eigenvalue ξ′, the disturbance
involved in the act of measurement causes a
jump in the state of the dynamical system.
From physical continuity, if we make a second
measurement of the same dynamical variable
immediately after the first, the result of the sec-
ond measurement must be the same as the first.
Thus after the first measurement has been made,
there is no indeterminacy in the result of the
second. Hence after the first measurement is
made, the system is in an eigenstate of the dy-
namical variable ξ, [. . . ]. In this way, we see
that a measurement always causes the system to
jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical vari-
able that is being measured, the eigenvalue this
eigenstate belongs to being equal to the result
of the first measurement [32, p. 36].
Again, before the first measurement, the system’s state
is generally inherently indeterminate, since its properties
depend strictly upon the act of observation.
According to Dirac’s views the remarkable novelties
introduced by quantum theory are on the one hand, the
non-commutative algebraic structure of its formalism,
given the notable consequences it implies, and on the
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other hand, the stochastic collapses of the wave func-
tion, which in this approach to quantum mechanics are
actual physical processes occurring in space—whereas
for Bohr such random jumps did not play any substantial
part in measurement situations. Furthermore, in Dirac’s
formulation of quantum theory one does not find claims
concerning the objectivity of quantum measurements in
terms of communicability of observational outcomes that
are typical of Bohr’s perspective.
It is also crucial for our argument to further emphasize
that Bohr’s principle of complementarity does not figure
in Dirac’s formulation of quantum mechanics. Rather
than introducing a kinematical and dynamical comple-
mentarity in quantum theory associated with experimental
protocols, he provided rigorous algebraic explanations
why non-commuting observables, as for instance posi-
tion and momentum, the particles’ spin along different
axis, etc., cannot be simultaneously measured, i.e. these
operators do not share a common basis of eigenstates.
Consequently, it follows that in Dirac’s theory experimen-
tal protocols do not play any decisive role in determining
the properties of a quantum object. Hence, Bohr’s com-
plementarity seems to play only a marginal role.
4.2 The Reciprocal Correspondence
Principle
Another fundamental tenet associated with the Copen-
hagen interpretation is Bohr’s correspondence princi-
ple. In a nutshell, it affirms that classical mechanics is
obtained—through limiting procedures—from quantum
theory, furthermore as Falkenburg [46, p. 126] claims,
“Bohr employed the principle in order to establish inter-
theoretical relations between the classical theory of radia-
tion and the quantum theory of atomic spectra. After the
rise of quantum mechanics, he justified his complementar-
ity view of quantum mechanics in terms of the correspon-
dence between mutually exclusive quantum phenomena
on the one hand and the classical concepts of wave or
particle [...] on the other hand”. Speaking about corre-
spondence principle and inter-theoretic relations between
classical and quantum mechanics, it is worth mentioning
also Heisenberg’s views. He thought that physical theo-
ries as classical Newtonian mechanics, thermodynamics,
Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, special relativity or
quantum mechanics, having reached a non-contradictory,
definite system of axioms, definitions and laws, and being
able to provide explanations for a notable set of phe-
nomena, were closed, in the sense that elements of these
theories “exhibit a tight interconnectedness prohibiting
any further modifications or improvements” Bokulich [2,
p. 378]. Interestingly, Heisenberg considered these frame-
works complete, accurate, and correct in their domain of
applications for all times, meaning that such theories will
be not modified or “called into question by any future
developments of science” (further details on Heisenberg’s
conception of physical theories and inter-theoretic rela-
tions are given in Bokulich [47]).
Contrary to both these views, not only the principle of
complementarity plays a little role in Dirac’s formulation
of quantum theory as we have seen above, but also the
correspondence principle has been reversed. Taking into
account the case study concerning the introduction of
the quantum mechanical ether, in fact, we explained that
Dirac’s strategy to remove the infinities from quantum
electrodynamics was to reformulate the classical theory,
where such infinite terms were already present. Thus,
he tried to solve puzzles of quantum theories by starting
from an improvement of the classical framework. This
example is sufficient to show the tension between Dirac’s
methodology with respect to both Bohr’s correspondence
principle and Heisenberg’s view of closed theories. As
correctly pointed out by Bokulich [2, p. 386], “[f]or Dirac
neither quantum mechanics nor classical mechanics has
reached its final form”. Moreover, he considered physical
theories always as approximations, and therefore, in con-
tinuous development and progress; to this regard in the
second session of his interview with T. Kuhn, Dirac stated:
“I think it’s very likely that all our equations are only ap-
proximate. Our present quantum theory is probably only
an approximation to the improvement of the future. I feel
that everything might be an approximation and this comes
very largely from the engineering training” [48].
Thus, Dirac viewed both classical and quantum me-
chanics as open theories, since both these frameworks are
subject to modifications and interplay:
My own opinion is that we ought to search for
a way of making fundamental changes not only
in our present Quantum Mechanics, but actually
in Classical Mechanics as well. Since Classical
Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics are closely
connected, I believe we may still learn from a
further study of Classical Mechanics. In this
point of view I differ from some theoretical
physicists, in particular Bohr and Pauli (Dirac
quoted in [2, p. 389]).
Next, let us consider another example showing the pe-
culiarity of Dirac’s positions with respect to those held by
Bohr and Heisenberg concerning inter-theoretic relations
among classical and quantum theories.
Following his open view of theories, in the essay On the
Analogy Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics [34],
Dirac aimed to recover and define the notion of particle
trajectory in the context of quantum mechanics, giving
to the latter a more intuitive, visualizable account for
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physical phenomena and extending the analogy between
these two theoretical frameworks (since Dirac looked
at the features and concepts of the classical theory to
modify and improve the quantum, Bokulich introduced
the expression reciprocal correspondence principle [2,
Section 6]). According to him, classical and quantum
theories were closely connected having a strong formal
similarity; to this regard, in fact, Dirac stated that
The value of classical analogy in the develop-
ment of quantum mechanics depends on the
fact that classical mechanics provides a valid
description of dynamical systems under cer-
tain conditions, when the particles and bodies
composing the systems are sufficiently massive
for the disturbance accompanying an observa-
tion to be negligible. Classical mechanics must
therefore be a limiting case of quantum mechan-
ics. We should thus expect to find that impor-
tant concepts in classical mechanics correspond
to important concepts in quantum mechanics,
and, from an understanding of the general na-
ture of the analogy between classical and quan-
tum mechanics, we may hope to get laws and
theorems in quantum mechanics appearing as
simple generalizations of well-known results in
classical mechanics [32, p. 84].
Similarly, at the outset of [34, p. 195], he declared that
There are two forms in which quantum mechan-
ics may be expressed, based on Heisenberg’s
matrices and Schro¨dinger’s wave functions re-
spectively. The second of these is not connected
very directly with classical mechanics. The first
is in close analogy with classical mechanics,
as it may be obtained from classical mechan-
ics simply by making the variables of classical
mechanics into non-commuting quantities sat-
isfying the correct commutation relations. [...]
In the case when the non-commuting quanti-
ties are observables, one can set up a theory of
functions of them of almost the same degree
of generality as the usual functions of commut-
ing variables and one can use this theory to
make closer the analogy between classical and
quantum mechanics.
In that paper, Dirac developed a new theory of functions
able to assign a probability for non-commuting observ-
ables to have well-defined values. Let us consider two
generic non-commuting observables α, β, and let f (a, b)
be a function of two real variables a, b defined when a, b
are eigenvalues of α, β respectively. Dirac showed how to
assign a meaning to the function f (α, β). In the first place,
define f (α, b) a function of the observable α, in which
the variable b appears as parameter, via the following
equation
f (α, b)|α′〉 = f (α′, b)|α′〉,
where |α′〉 represents an eigenstate of α with eigenvalue
α′ (this equation is valid for every eigenvalue of α). Simi-
larly one defines f (α, β) via
f (α, β)|β′〉 = f (α′, β′)|β′〉,
where |β′〉 represents an eigenstate of β with eigenvalue
β′. Such function determines the linear operator f (α, β).
Therefore, we have finally defined a general function of
the two non-commuting observables α and β. This defi-
nition can be extended to the general case involving any
number of non-commuting operators. It must be noted,
however, that such definition is associated to an order of
these non-commuting observables: “The observables that
one uses in practice in Heisenberg’s form of quantum me-
chanics are the values of dynamical variables at particular
times. They fall into a natural linear order, namely the
order of the times to which they refer. Our theory now en-
ables us to set up general functions of them, based on this
order. The functions must not involve two observables
referring to exactly the same time, unless they commute.
Apart from this limitation, the power of forming functions
that we now have is just as general as in the classical the-
ory” [34, p. 196]. Dirac associated these new functions a
complex probability value, which should be interpreted
as the meaning that for quantum observables α, β, γ, . . .
are unlikely to have eigenvalues α′, β′, γ′, . . . . As a fi-
nal step he used these probabilities to introduce quantum
trajectories. In more details, in this theory, a quantum
trajectory is constructed from a series of transition am-
plitudes between pairs of adjacent points xi at different,
successive times ti (for further details, the reader may
refer to the original paper [34]; interesting discussions
about quantum trajectories in the context of Dirac’s work
and its connections with David Bohm are contained in
Hiley et al. [49, 50]). Time can be so small allowing to
divide the trajectory into infinitesimal segments: 〈x′t |xt0〉
is then the probability amplitude of a quantum particle
traveling in space from point x at time t0 to point x′ at
time t > t0. The particle may travel through intermediate
points as well (if x, x′ are not adjacent). In the general
case (when a particle passes through intermediate points),
one may write:
〈x′t |xt0〉 =
∫
. . .
∫
〈x′t |xn〉dxn〈xn|xn−1〉dxn−1 . . . dx1〈x1|xt0〉
where 〈xi+1|xi〉 is the propagator of the particle being at
xi at time ti and arriving at point xi+1 at time ti+1.
Quanta | DOI: 10.12743/quanta.v8i1.93 November 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 1 | Page 84
Since this probability is in general a complex number,
as already pointed out, Dirac claimed that this theory
gets “a formal probability for the trajectory of the sys-
tem in quantum mechanics lying within certain limits.
This enables us to speak of some trajectories being im-
probable and others being likely” [34, p. 197], and there-
fore it provides a more intuitive picture of the motion of
quantum objects in space (this paper, although not very
much discussed in the philosophical literature, has influ-
enced Feynman’s work on the path integral formulation
of quantum mechanics. For details the reader may refer
to Feynman [51, p. 367] and Schweber [52, Chapter 8]).
Having underlined the contrasting views Dirac held
with respect to many fundamental tenets of Bohr’s and
Heisenberg’s perspectives on quantum mechanics, we
conclude that it would be erroneous to claim that Dirac
was a fervent supporter of the Copenhagen interpretation.
5 Conclusion
Although Dirac’s ideas on quantum theory have been
heavily influenced by Bohr and Heisenberg, physicists
with whom he had intense and long correspondence and
personal relationships, we have argued that Dirac should
not be considered a scientist methodologically guided by
the observability doctrine, despite his explicit defence of
the latter in several places. We also claimed that his views
concerning quantum theory should be disentangled from
those of the Copenhagen interpretation.
More specifically, after having introduced the tenets of
the observability principle, we discussed two case studies
showing how such principle played little role in Dirac’s
own works, since he postulated the existence of formally
unobservable theoretical entities—which are also causally
inert—such as the infinite sea of negative electrons and
the quantum mechanical ether. Hence, we concluded that
his support of the observability doctrine was substantially
more rhetorical than practical. Furthermore, not only we
showed how Dirac’s views about the quantum theory of
measurement come into conflict with the views of Bohr,
but we also emphasized his different ideas towards the
correspondence principle and the inter-theoretic relations
between classical and quantum mechanics, claiming that
his perspective on quantum theory—and on physics and
mathematics in general—should be kept sharply sepa-
rated from those held by Bohr and Heisenberg.
In summary, reading Dirac’s works one cannot but note
how complex a personality he was, a scientist difficult
to insert in predefined categories due to his creative and
innovative approach to physics and mathematics; in a
century in which the new quantum paradigm was devel-
oped and imposed itself, and classical ideas were seen
as definitively surpassed, he viewed physical theories as
essentially mathematical structures which are always sub-
ject to modifications, changes and improvements, without
any pretension to achieve an ultimate description of real-
ity, and without any dogmatic attitude towards the future
progress of physics.
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